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PATTERN MAKERS' LEAGUE OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFL-CIO v. NLRB:* SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS FEDERAL LIMITATION ON UNION
POWER TO COMPEL STRIKE ACTIVITY
The National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"),1 as amended,
105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act (or Wagner
Act) of 1935 declares that the public policy of the United States is to encourage and
facilitate collective bargaining through unions in which employees select representatives to further their interests. Id. § 151. The Act announced substantive rules of
labor law and established the National Labor Relations Board with power to interpret and administer the law. Id. § 156. See infra note 18.
The Act immediately came under constitutional attack when its opponents argued that the Act, as applied to manufacturing, went beyond the Commerce Clause
and violated the States' tenth amendment rights. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This argument was rejected, however, and the constitutionality of the Act upheld in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., where the Supreme Court
held that Congress may control activities which may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if these activities have such a "close and substantial" relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens or obstructions. Id. at 3.
Under the Wagner Act of 1935, unions and employers were permitted to enter
into collective bargaining agreements requiring that employees become union members as a condition precedent to employment. National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982)).
These "closed shop" agreements became the primary means by which unions acquired and exercised power over unwilling members. See Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv. L. REv. 274, 291-99 (1948) (closed
shop may prevent employer from obtaining competent workers, since he must select
employees from ranks of the union).
The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C §§ 141-187 (1982)) reenacted and
amended the Act of 1935 to prohibit the closed shop, but permitted agreements
under which employees were required to become and remain members of the union
within 30 days after employment (the "union shop"). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Such an agreement, however, required membership only to the extent of paying dues
and initiation fees. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963)
(involuntary membership is restricted to the "financial core" of the payment of fees
and dues). See also United Stanford Employees, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977) (union must
notify new employees that they are not required to become full members or will be
committing an unfair labor practice). In 1959, the Act was amended further with the
passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (also known
as the Landrum-Griffin Act). Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 401-531 (1982)). This amendment to the Act
was intended to regulate unions' internal affairs and recognized a union's right to
discipline by fining, suspension, expulsion, "or otherwise," but restricts such discipline to union members. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). In addition, the Landrum-Griffin Act
recognized the right of unions to prescribe reasonable rules which would require disciplinary action if violated, but expressly restricted such rules to those relating to the
*
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prohibits a union from restraining or coercing 2 employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in or refrain from concerted activities.8 In Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v.
NLRB," the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a union rule 5 that restricts members from resigning from
the union during a strikes or at a time when a strike appears imminent, violates the statutory rights of employees to refrain from engaging in union activities, in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.7 The Court resolved this issue in favor of the employee, justifiaresponsibility of union members. Id. § 411(a)(2).

2. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of this Act; Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein....
29 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
3. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining for other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) of this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
4. 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
5. The rule at issue in Pattern Makers' was League Law 13, which provided
that "[n]o resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall
be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears
imminent." Id. at 3066. All members of the Union were required to take an oath of
membership, obligating them to adhere to the union's "Constitution, Laws, Rules and
Decisions." Brief for Petitioners at 3, Pattern Makers' League of North America,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
The union contended that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), which provides for the
right of a union to prescribe its own rules with respect to the "acquisition or retention
of membership," encompasses League Law 13 and gave them an absolute right to
restrict resignations during the strike. PatternMakers', 105 S. Ct. at 3071-72. This
proviso has been interpreted to give unions broad authority to promulgate and enforce rules regulating internal union affairs. See, eg., Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969) (Court upheld a union rule which imposed fines on members who exceeded
specified ceilings under a piecework production system); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (unions could assess and collect fines against members
who crossed picket lines and worked during a strike called by the union).
6. The Supreme Court has never determined whether there is an absolute constitutional right to strike. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926) (strike in question
did not involve a controversy over "wages, hours or conditions of labor, discipline or
discharge of an employee, or the employment of non-union labor" and was, therefore,
not afforded protection under the common law or any rights under the fourteenth
amendment).
Federal regulation of strikes is based principally upon the Act, as amended. 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Section 7 grants employees the right to "engage in concerted activity," and this language is read to guarantee the right to strike and picket.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. For the full text of § 8(b)(1)(A), see supra note 2.

19861

Pattern Makers' League, AFL-CIO v. NLRB

bly holding that such a union rule impermissibly abridges the statutory right of employees to refrain from engaging in union activities.,
In so holding, the Court resolved the inherent conflict between an
employee's section 7 right to refrain from collective activity and a
union's authority to regulate its internal affairs.
On May 5, 1977, forty-three members of the Rockford, Illinois,
and Beloit, Wisconsin, locals of the Pattern Makers' Union went on
strike against several manufacturing companies. 0 During the next
seven months of the strike," eleven union members submitted resignations to the union and returned to work, thereby violating the
union's League Law 1312 which prohibited strike-time resignations."'
Thereafter, the union levied fines" against ten"5 of the strikebreakers and informed them that their resignations could not be accepted
because they had violated League Law 13.'6
The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association 7 filed
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)'O against
8. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3064.
9. Id. at 3076 (White, J., concurring) ("The Board has adopted a sensible construction of the imprecise language of §§ 7 and 8 that is not negated by the legislative
history of the Act"). For the text of § 7, see supra note 3. For the text of § 8(b)(1)(A),
see supra note 2.
10. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
11. The strike began on May 5, 1977, and ended on December 19, 1977, after
the membership accepted the employers' contract offer and the parties signed a new
collective bargaining agreement. Id.
12. For the complete text of League Law 13, see supra note 5.
13. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066. It is well established that a union may
not impose a fine upon an employee who is not a member of the organization, including an employee who has resigned from the union to escape disciplinary action for
violating an internal union rule. See, eg., Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412
U.S. 84, 88 (1973) (the Court recognized the § 7 right to resign from union membership and avoid union fines, but left open the question of the extent to which contractual restrictions on a member's right to resign may be limited by the Act); NLRB v.
Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972)

(same).
14. Each member was fined the equivalent of his earnings during the strike.
Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066. The monetary fine is but one of many penalties
that a union may impose on its members as a disciplinary measure. Other measures
of union discipline include suspension, expulsion, reprimands, and removal from office. Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1032 (1976).
15. One employee who returned back to work during the strike was denied readmission to the union because he refused to pay $4,200 in "damages" for abandoning the strike and returning to work. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066 n.2.
16. See supra note 5.
17. This Association had represented the employers throughout the collective
bargaining process. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
18. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created to administer the
law created by the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). The NLRB
consists of five members who are appointed for five year terms by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 153(a). The primary functions of the
Board are to determine employee representatives within industries under the jurisdiction of the Act, and to decide whether a particular challenged activity constitutes an
unfair labor practice. Id. § 160.
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the union and its two locals, alleging that the union had committed
an unfair labor practice19 when it levied fines against those employees who had returned to work. 20 An Administrative Law Judge ruled
that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act 2' when it
fined the employees for returning to work after they had tendered
their resignations.2 2 The NLRB agreed with this ruling, relying on
its earlier decision in Machinists Local 1327, InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB's
which held that fining employees for returning to work after they
had resigned from the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.2 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the NLRB's order,25 holding that League Law 1326 was invalid because it frustrates the overriding policy of labor law that employees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
review the decision of the Seventh Circuit.2 8 The Court wanted to

resolve the conflict between the circuit courts" over the validity of
restrictions on union members' right to resign.30 The Court addressed the issue of whether a union is precluded from fining employees who have attempted to resign" when a union's constitution
prohibits resignation during a strike or at a time when a strike appears imminent." The Court construed section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Acts" as prohibiting the fining of such employees under these circumstances."' Accordingly, the Court deferred to the NLRB's interpretation of the Act" and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Cir19. See supra note 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act).
20. Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO, 265 N.L.R.B. 1332
(1982), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
21. See supra note 2.
22. Pattern Makers', 265 N.L.R.B. at 1331.
23. 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985).
24. See supra note 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act).
25. Pattern Makers', 724 F.2d at 57.
26. See supra note 5.
27. Pattern Makers', 724 F.2d at 60.
28. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3064.
29. Unlike the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pattern Makers', the Ninth Circuit
endorsed a union's contractual restraint on strike-time resignations. Machinists Local
1327, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985).
30. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
31. The union had notified 10 of the 11 employees who had returned to work
that their resignations had been rejected under League Law 13. Id.
32. See supra note 5.
33. See supra note 2.
34. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3064.
35. Congress has given the NLRB broad power to devise remedies to implement
the policies of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). The NLRB is authorized to require
the perpetrator of an unfair labor practice "to take such affirmative action ... as will
effectuate the policies of th[e] Act .

. .

. " Id.
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cuit enforcing the NLRB's order.8 s
The Court began its analysis citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co., s 7 in which it held that the language of section

8(b)(1)(A) of the Act"5 may be construed to allow union imposition
of disciplinary fines upon members who crossed picket lines to return to work during a strike.8 9 In Allis-Chalmers," the Court substantially relied on the legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act"' when it ruled that the imposition of fines on union members
does not "restrain or coerce" them in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed under section 7 to engage in or refrain from engaging in
concerted activity. 2 The Court in Allis-Chalmers43 differentiated
between the internal affairs of a union," through which it might discipline its members with fines and expulsion, and external activities,"' through which the union urges the employer to take action in
7
an effort to discipline its member.4" In following this precedent,'
36.
37.
38.
39.

Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3076.
388 U.S. 175 (1967).
See supra note 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act).
Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3068 (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.

Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)). In Allis-Chalmers, 175 members of a 7,400-member bargaining unit returned to work during a strike when the union's constitution prohibited strikebreaking. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 176. A number of these strikebreakers were fined, and the union argued that these fines were judicially enforceable
under the theory that the terms of its constitution constituted a contract between the
member and the union and was, therefore, a legal obligation. Id. at 179.
40. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 175.
41. See supra note 2.
42. Allis-Chalmers, the Court quoted extensively from legislative materials addressing § 8(b)(1)(A). Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 185-92. The Court stressed that §
8(b)(1)(A) was enacted to prohibit restraint and coercion by unions in organizational
campaigns and observed in this regard that:
[T]he purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that where unions, in
their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if an employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices, such as making threats orfalse promises or false statements, the unions also shall be guilty of unfair labor practices.
Id. at 186 (quoting 93 CONG. REc. 4271 (1947)).
43. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 175.
44. Internal affairs of the union include disciplinary measures which do not
jeopardize a member's employment status and are, therefore, permissible under §
8.(b)(1)(A). See Wellington, supra note 14, at 1022.
45. External activities affect a union member's job status and contravene §
8(b)(1)(A). See Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428; Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195.
The internal-external dichotomy originated in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954). In Minneapolis Star, the NLRB upheld the imposition of a
union levied fine upon a member who refused to perform picket duty. Id. at 727. The
NLRB held that Congress had specifically intended to distinguish internal enforcement of union discipline from external enforcement which is subject to the prohibitions of § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 728-29. If a union deprives a member of his right to work,
this will be considered external because it affects his employment status and is thus a
violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). Id.
46. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 175.
47. Id.
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however, the Pattern Makers' Court ' emphasized that while
a
49'
it
union may have the power to control its own "internal affairs,
does not have the same power to place restrictions on a union member's right to resign from the union.50
The Court made two findings in order to support its conclusion
that a limit must be placed on a union's ability to prohibit striketime resignations.5 1 It found that both prior case law5 2 and legislative history 3 supported the NLRB's interpretation 4 of section

8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,55 and that this construction was reasonable.56
Specifically, the Court relied on its decision in Scofield v. NLRB,5"
where it had further delineated the extent to which a union may
control its members within the constraints of section 8(b)(1)(A) 5
The PatternMakers' Court, citing Scofield, adopted the proposition
that a labor organization may impose disciplinary fines against one
of its members only if the members are free to leave the union and
escape the union rules.50
48. Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in the plurality opinion,
with Justice White concurring. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Pattern Makers', 105 S.Ct. at 3064.
49. Id. at 3069. See also supra note 44 for discussion of "internal" union affairs.
50. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3069. The Court cited several cases to
demonstrate how case law has supported the willingness of the courts to allow a
union member to resign without being penalized. Id. See, e.g., Bayer v. Brotherhood
of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, Local 301, 308 N.J. Eq. 257,
262, 154 A. 759, 761 (1931) ("association is a voluntary one, and the workmen may
decline to become members or withdraw from membership, if dissatisfied with the
conduct of its affairs"); Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 540, 38 P. 547,
551 (1894) ("No resort can be had to compulsory methods of any kind either to increase, keep up, or retain such membership").
51. Pattern Makers', 105 S.Ct. at 3069.
52. See Granite State, 409 U.S. 213; Scofield, 394 U.S. 423.
53. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
54. The Board ruled that a union may not restrict a member's right to resign
and may not extend its disciplinary authority under the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) to
fine an employee who is no longer a union member. PatternMakers', 265 N.L.R.B. at
1336.
55. See supra note 2.
56. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3076.
57. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
58. Id. at 428. See also supra note 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A)).
59. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3067 (citing Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430). In
Scofield, the Supreme Court reiterated the internal-external dichotomy (for a discussion of this dichotomy, see supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text) and upheld
fines imposed upon union members who had violated a union rule regarding production ceilings. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 423. In doing so, the Scofield Court rejected the
employee's argument that union enforcement of the rule through court collection of
fines was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A). The Court in Scofield
thus adopted a three part test to be used in considering those situations which involve conflicts between section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 7 of the Act. Scofield, 394 U.S.
at 430. Under this approach, a union may enforce its own rules with respect to union
membership if: the rules are properly adopted; if they reflect a legitimate union interest; if they do not impair an aspect of national labor policy inherent in the labor laws;
and if the rules are reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave
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In addition to citing precedent 0 in order to stress the importance of a union member's freedom to exercise his section 7 rights,6 '
the Pattern Makers' Court acknowledged that prior NLRB decisions 2 had found union resignation restrictions inconsistent with
the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in section 8(a)(3) of the
Act." The Court emphasized that pursuant to the Taft-Hartley
Act's prohibition against compulsory union membership, 6' "full"
union membership can no longer be a condition precedent to obtaining employment.6 0 The Court concluded that the union's League
Law 1366 frustrated an employee's freedom to resign from full union
membership. 7 In making this conclusion, the Court rejected the
the union in order to escape the rule. Id.
The Scofield Court did admit that the union's rule had and intended to have an
impact beyond the internal affairs of the union organization but concluded that the
rule did not necessarily violate § 8(b)(1)(A), "unless ... impairment of a statutory
labor policy [is] shown." Id. at 432. For a more detailed analysis of the Court's decisions in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, see Coleman, Union Discipline Under
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act: The Emergence of a New Trilogy, 45
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219 (1970); Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline
Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1067.
60. The test set forth in Scofield was applied by the Court in Granite State,
where the Court employed a contract analysis to justify its "free to leave the union"
mandate of Scofield. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217. The Court held that absent a
contractual provision in the union's constitution or bylaws restricting a member's
right to resign, the union fines violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Id. at 215.
61. See supra note 3.
62. The NLRB has consistently adopted the position that the Act permits no
restriction on the right of union members to resign. See International Association of
Machinists, Local Lodge 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257, 1260
(June 22, 1984); Engineers Union Local 444, 235 N.L.R.B. 98 (1978); Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, Local Union No. 170, 225 N.L.R.B 1178 (1976).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). This section provides:
[Nbo employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization ... if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id.
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). The closed shop was a major target of the TaftHartley Act. See supra note 1. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
opposed compulsory union membership, stating:
It is clear that the closed shop which requires preexisting union membership as
a condition of obtaining employment creates too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated ....

Numerous examples were presented to the

committee of the way union leaders have used closed-shop devices as a method
of depriving employees of their jobs, and in some cases a means of securing a
livelihood in their trade or calling, for purely capricious reasons.
SENATE CoMMirrTE

ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

ACT oF 1947, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIrE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AT, 1947, at 412 (1948).
65. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3071.
66. See supra note 5.
67. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3071.
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union's argument that League Law 136s does not interfere with an
employee's section 7 rights."
In concluding that League Law 1370 unlawfully restrains union
members in the exercise of their right to refrain from participating
in concerted activity, 1 the Court examined the legislative history of
the Act, and rejected the union's three arguments. 7 The union first
argued that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act' s validates a
union rule restricting the right to resign.7 The Court, however,
stated that neither it nor the NLRB had ever interpreted this proviso as allowing unions to restrict resignation through its rules. 7' Instead, the Court concluded that rules pertaining to the retention of
membership are those that provide for the expulsion of union members, not the indefinite retention of members who no longer want to
remain union members.7 The Court found that the legislative history of both the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts supported
77
this conclusion.
The Court also rejected the union's second contention that the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act" indicates that Congress
did not intend to protect a union member's right to resign.7 ' The
union argued that Congress' failure to adopt congressional legislation60 protecting a union member's right to resign, demonstrated
68. See supra note 5.
69. PatternMakers', 105 S. Ct. at 3071. See also supra note 3 (text of § 7 of the
Act).
70. See supra note 5.
71. See supra note 3 (text of federal statutory right to refrain from engaging in
concerted activity).
72. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3071-75.
73. See infra note 125.
74. PatternMakers', 105 S. Ct. at 3072. The League had contended that a rule
providing that a union member is required to continue membership during a strike is
a rule "with respect to the retention of membership" and is, therefore, within the
protection of § 8(b)(1)(A) and its proviso. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court suggested that the legislative history of the Act confirms the
conclusion that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) allows unions to enforce only internal rules
that establish who may and may not become a union member and what conduct will
result in expulsion from the union. Id. The Court noted that the proviso's sponsor,
Senator Holland, specifically stated that § 8(b)(1)(A) should not prohibit union rules
"which [have] to do with the admission or the expulsion of members." Id. (quoting 93
CONG. Rac. 4271 (1947)).
78. See supra note 1 (Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the National Labor Relations Act).
79. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
80. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)(4) reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY op THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 180 (1948). Section
8(c) of the House bill created ten unfair labor practices regulating the relationship
between unions and their members. Id. § 8(c). Section 8(c)(4) made it a union unfair
labor practice to deny any member the right to resign. Id. § 8(c)(4). UnLxe the House
bill, the Senate bill was passed, but did not include specific employee rights to resign.
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that Congress did not intend to protect this right.8 " The Court, however, stated that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act does
not support this contention. 2 The Court reasoned that the language
regarding the "right to resign" was only included in the original
House bill"3 to protect workers who had been victimized by the
closed shop provision8 4 and were unable to resign without losing
their jobs.85 The Court concluded that the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act, which prohibit the closed shop,"' revealed Congress' belief that it was unnecessary to explicitly preserve
87
the right to resign.
Finally, the union argued that because the common law does
not prohibit restrictions such as those contained in League Law 13,88
this provision does not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 9 The
Court found that this argument was without merit. To support this
conclusion, the Court cited NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,90 which held that although a union rule may be valid under the
common law of associations," it may still conflict with and therefore
93
2
violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act as an unfair labor practice.
The Court in PatternMakers' justifiably concluded that League
Law 13 impermissibly abridged the section 7 right, of employees to
refrain from engaging in union activities. This decision was correct
for three reasons. First, federal labor policy and the legislative history of the Act establish that Congress intended to protect the freedom of employees to resign from a union and escape union disciSee supra note 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act).
81. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
82. Id. at 3073-74.
83. See supra note 80.
84. See supra note 1 (Taft-Hartley amendments banned closed shop).
85. PatternMakers', 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
86. See supra note 1.
87. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
88. See supra note 5.
89. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3074. The union had argued that it had a
common law right to adopt and enforce League Law 13 under the common law of
associations. Brief for Petitioner at 36-38, Pattern Makers' League of North America,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
90. 391 U.S. 418 (1968) (held that a union rule requiring members to exhaust
union remedies before filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board was unenforceable because the rule was contrary to the policy of the Act in favor of unfettered
access to the NLRB).
91. "Association" has been defined as "[t]he act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose of business." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (5th
ed. 1979). Under the common law of associations, an association may place restrictions on its member's right to resign where such restrictions are designed to further a
basic purpose for which the association was formed. 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 6, 19, 22
(1980).
92. See supra note 2.
93. PatternMakers', 105 S. Ct. at 3074-75 (citing NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968)).
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pline as a fundamental policy of the Act. Second, a union's
prohibition against member resignation should be unenforceable because union membership under the Act is not wholly voluntary. Finally, League Law 13 is invalid under the Scofield test.
First, the Supreme Court's approach to the conflict between
section 7 and section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act"' is based on the impact
of federal labor policy and the legislative history of the Act.93 The
entire range and tone of the legislative history confirms the intent of
Congress to eliminate repressive union tactics against employees exercising their section 7 right 6 to refrain from concerted activities .9
An analysis of the Act and the Taft-Hartley amendments of the
Act" reveals Congress' intent to balance the national labor policy by
94. See supra notes 2 (text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act) and 3 (text of § 7 of the
Act).
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96. For the complete text of § 7, see supra note 3. The protected right of an
employee to cross a picket line during a strike without union threat or coercion is
firmly imbedded in the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). As Senator Taft, a leading
sponsor of the legislation, observed in his analysis of the conference agreement on the
Act: "[T]he House conferees insisted that there be express language in section 7
which would make the prohibition contained in section 8(b)(1)(A) apply to coercive
acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or a picket line." 93 CONG. REc. 7000-01, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1622-23 (1948)
(emphasis added).
The protection of the right to refrain from engaging in a strike, however, does
not in any way interfere with the right to strike which is guaranteed by the Act.
Senator Taft expressly covered this point during the debates on § 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. In response to the charge that § 8(b)(1)(A) would prevent unions from engaging
in strike activity, Senator Taft stated:
It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing, or employing persuasion. All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint
and coercion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go
to work.
93 CONG. REc. 4436, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT'r, 1947, at 1207 (1948) (emphasis added).
97. Section 7 of the Act grants employees the right to engage in or refrain from
engaging in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and for
other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). For the full text of § 7, see
supra note 3. For a particular activity to be protected under § 7, there must be some
element of "concert" pertaining to more than one employee. See, e.g., NLRB v. Office
Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953) (individual complaints regarding working conditions are not protected as "concerted activity" under § 7 of the Act). Cf.
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971) (activity by an individual
employee will be protected if it is "looking toward group action").
As the language of § 7 makes clear, it is not necessary to have a union sponsored
concerted activity in order that the activity be protected as "concerted" for "mutual
aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,
370 U.S. 9 (1962) (Court held that non-union employees who had staged a walkout
because they believed it was too cold to continue work had engaged in protected concerted activity).
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). See supra note 1 (Taft-Hartley amendments
outlawed the closed shop which made union membership a condition precedent to
obtaining employment, while allowing the union shop which makes union member-
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placing a limitation on coercive union compacts. 9"

Moreover, the enactment of sections 8(b)(1)(A),'

00

8(a)(3),"'

102

and 8(b)(2)
of the Act demonstrates that Congress intended to
protect employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights 03 without
coercive union interference. When Congress debated the advisability
of the Taft-Hartley amendments, 10' Congress indicated that its policy was "to insulate employee's jobs from their organizational
rights."' 015 Although Congress has never specifically addressed the
problem of a union fining members who resign and refuse to strike,
section 7 of the Act'06 provides that employees have a "right to refrain" from concerted activity. 07 Congress, therefore, insured that
all employees are protected against a union's attempt to restrain or
coerce them in making a decision to refrain from engaging in any
concerted activity, even a strike.
ship a condition subsequent to employment).
99. Senator Taft's discussion regarding the purpose of enacting § 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act included references to an employee's right to be free of coercion from a union
which may force the employee to engage in undesired union activities. Senator Taft
stated:
If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past
ten years, it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be
subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right of
protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.
93 CONG. REC. 4023, reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1028 (1948).
100. For the full text of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, see supra note 2.
101. For the full text of § 8(a)(3) of the Act, see supra note 67.
102. Section 8(b)(2) of the Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - (2)
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
In light of § 8(b)(2) and its prohibition on causing employer discrimination based
on union membership, it is interesting to note that the union in PatternMakers' had
requested that the employer discharge one of the employees who had returned to
work because he was no longer a member of the union as required by the union security provision in the collective bargaining agreement. Brief for Respondents, at 4, Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 105 S.Ct. 3064 (1985).
The union had refused to allow the employee to reacquire his membership until he
paid $4,200 in fines, $211 in back dues, and a $500 fee in order to be readmitted to
the union. Id.
103. See supra note 3.
104. See supra note 1.
105. Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Tel. Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,
40 (1954) (Court held that sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act were designed to
allow employees to freely exercise their right to either join or abstain from joining a
union).
106. For the full text of § 7 of the Act, see supra note 3.
107. See supra note 97 (protected concerted activity).
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This legislative history demonstrates that unless a union member is free to resign from his union in order to avoid a union rule
prohibiting him from returning to work, the section 7 right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities is rendered null and void.
This interpretation of the legislative history finds support in Supreme Court decisions acknowledging that Congress intended to balance the national labor policy in favor of the employee's right to
refrain from engaging in concerted activities.'" 8 Moreover, the thrust
of the decision in Pattern Makers and its resultant effect on Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB"'0 affirms that this is the correct inter108. In both Granite State, 409 U.S. 213, and Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. 84, the
Supreme Court held that a union violates § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it fines employees who resign from the union and return to work during a strike.
In Granite State, 409 U.S. 213, the union membership voted to strike if a new
collective bargaining agreement was not reached before expiration of the previous
one. Id. at 214. After the strike began, the union members agreed that any strike
breaker would be subject to a $2,000 fine. Id. Subsequently, several employees resigned from the union, returned to work, and were fined the equivalent of a day's
wages for each day worked during the strike. Id. In refusing to enforce the fines that
the union imposed on the employees, the Court distinguished the situation in Granite
State from that in Allis-Chalmers. Id. at 215. In Allis-Chalmers, the union had imposed fines on full union members, whereas in Granite State, the union had attempted to fine employees who were no longer members of the union. Id.
Similarly, in Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. 84, a group of employees who had crossed
picket lines during a strike were fined by the union under a constitutional provision
that prohibited "members" from strikebreaking. Id. at 86. Those employees who returned to work sent letters of resignation to the union either before returning to work
or shortly after doing so. Id. at 85. The Court held that fining employees for their
post-resignation activities constituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 88. The Court
rejected the union's argument that the fines could be imposed against a former member under a breach of contract theory, stating:
(I]n order to sustain the Union's position, we would first have to find ... that
the Union constitution by implication extended its sanctions to nonmembers,
and then further conclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act.
But we are no more disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment
from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union's constitution here than we
were to find it from the employee's participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in Textile Workers [NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972)].
Id. at 89-90.
More importantly, the Court has recently reiterated its policy to prohibit union
coercion and restraint on strike-time resignations in Machinists Local 1327, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212
(9th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985). See infra note 109.
109. 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985), vacating and remanding, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.
1984). In Machinists Local 1327, the NLRB invalidated fines imposed upon former
union members pursuant to a similar constitutional provision as that found in Pattern Makers'. Machinists Local 1327, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F.2d
1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985). The NLRB held
that "a union rule which limits the right of a union member to resign only to nonstrike periods constitutes an unreasonable restriction on a member's Section 7 right
to resign." Machinists Local 1327, 163 N.L.R.B. at 986. The Ninth Circuit refused to
enforce the NLRB's order, maintaining that, under the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), the
member's obligation was no less than the obligation the union constitution and bylaws establish:
[T]he terms of the contract before us condition the member's right to resign on
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pretation of the legislative history."'
The second reason why the decision in Pattern Makers' is justified follows from the fact that the Act"' permits a form of compulsory union membership under the union shop provision." 2 Thus employees may not always join unions freely and voluntarily. Unlike
Illinois and Wisconsin,"' several states have enacted "right-towork" laws," 4 which forbid union shop provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 13 The purpose of these laws is to protect employees from compulsory union membership under the union shop
provision."' In light of the fact that the union shop provision rehis promise not to break the strike. If the member can escape his obligations
by pleading, when the union attempts to collect the fine, that he is no longer
part of the union, then the terms of his contract mean little.
Machinists Local 1327, 725 F.2d at 1218.
The Supreme Court, in light of PatternMakers', vacated the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit and has remanded the case to comply with its decision in PatternMakers'. Machinists Local 1327, 105 S. Ct. at 3517. Thus, the Court has further established a statutory "right to resign" grounded in § 7 of the Act.
110. See supra notes 74 and 77 and accompanying text (PatternMakers' Court
interpretation of applicable legislative history).
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982).
112. See supra note 63 (text of § 8(a)(3) which permits union shop). A collective bargaining agreement that contains a union shop provision may be conceptualized as a contract of "adhesion" because "[t]he member has no choice as to terms but
is compelled to adhere to the inflexible ones presented." Summers, Legal Limitations
on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (1951). See also Keesler, Contracts
of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. R.v. 629,
642 (1943) (The decision of whether to enforce contracts of adhesion will depend not
only on the "social importance of the type of contract" but also on "the degree of
monopoly enjoyed by the author").
In this regard, it is significant to note that the dissent in PatternMakers' relied
heavily on a contract theory to justify the imposition of fines pursuant to League Law
13. PatternMakers', 105 S.Ct. at 3077-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The attempt to
classify the union-member relationship as contractual has often met with opposition
by those who argue that it is nothing more than a legal fiction. See, e.g., Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951). For a thorough
analysis of the differences between a collective bargaining agreement and a traditional contract, see Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
MicH. L. REV. 1, 5-25 (1958).
113. These are the states in which the two local unions were located in Pattern
Makers'. Pattern Makers', 105 S.Ct. at 3066.
114. The states that have enacted right-to-work statutes are Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Toner, Right-to- Work Laws and Union Security Contracts, 28 LAB.L.J. 240, 240-43 (1977).

115. Section 14(b) of the Act, added by the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947,
authorizes states to enact right-to-work laws that prohibit collective bargaining agreements from "requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any state." 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982). See also Grodin & Beeson, State
Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 CALI. L. REV. 95 (1964) (discussion on states that have adopted right-to-work laws); Henderson, The Confrontation
of Federal Preemption and State Right to Work Laws, 1967 DuKE L.J. 1079 (1967)
(federal courts' attitude toward right-to-work laws).
116. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (upheld
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quires compulsory membership, at least to the extent of paying dues
and initiation fees, 1 it is not appropriate to consider membership
in any union as completely voluntary.
In Pattern Makers', the union contended that the employees
who had returned to work had violated League Law 13118 and were
subject to the union's discipline rules.11 9 This contention was premised on the fiction that the members had "voluntarily" joined the
union, therefore binding themselves to its rules. 120 The practical effect of League Law 13121 was to prevent any opportunity for an employee to leave the union. If Congress intended to give a union the
authority to require its members to remain members indefinitely,
section 7 of the Act does not reflect this intention. 12 Further, no fair
reading of the legislative history of both section 7122 and section
8(b)(1)(A) 124 supports the contention that the proviso to section
establish a rule that
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act 2 5 authorizes a union12 to
6
forces a member to remain so indefinitely.
Another argument that the union advanced in Pattern Makstate court's interpretation that its right-to-work law outlawed not only the union
shop but also the agency shop, which required employees to give the union financial
support).
According to a survey conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs, 73 percent of
the existing collective bargaining agreements in the United States contain union shop
provisions which require employees to become and remain members of a union as a
condition of employment. Collective BargainingNegotiations and Contracts (BNA)
No. 2, at 87:1-87:4 (1983). Such "membership," however, is limited to the payment of
dues and initiation fees. NLRB v. General Motors Corp, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). In General Motors, the Supreme Court enunciated the "financial membership" test, stating:
"It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights may in turn be conditioned only upon
payment of fees and dues." Id.
117. See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
118. See supra note 5.
119. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
120. Id.
121. For the full text of League Law 13, see supra note 5.
122. For the full text of § 7 of the Act, see supra note 3.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 2.
125. The proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) states: "Provided,that this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
acquisition or retention of membership therein ......
(1982).
126. The proviso by its terms relates only to "acquisition or retention of membership." Id. From the language of this section, it is fair to conclude that had Congress intended to allow unions to impose discipline to former members, that desire
would have surfaced at some point during the congressional debates. The discipline
to which the debates referred was limited exclusively to expulsion from membership.
In addressing arguments that § 8(b)(1)(A) would interfere with a union's internal
affairs, Senator Taft explained: "They still will be able to fire any members they wish
to fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members." 93 CONG. REc. 4193,
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMiL.rr RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 1097 (1948) (emphasis added).
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ers' 27 with regard to voluntary membership was that under the
common law of associations,1 28 a union member may be restricted
from resigning during a strike.1 2 9 This argument is flawed for two
reasons. First, as the Pattern Makers' court noted, where the common law conflicts with statutory labor policy, the latter will prevail.180 Thus, even if we assume, arguendo, that the common law of
associations allows a union to restrict member resignation during a
13 1
strike, such a restriction is still invalid. This is because the Act
2
prohibits such restrictions,1 and therefore supersedes the common
law upon which the union bases its argument.
The union's argument fails for another reason. The purpose of
the Act' 33 and its section 7 right" to refrain from concerted activities, is to protect the employee's freedom of association, and not inhibit such freedom.' 85 The appropriate doctrine to apply is that of
voluntary association.13" Under this doctrine, a member of an association is free to resign, even though this freedom is subject to any
3
financial obligations owed the association.1 7
Finally, application of the Supreme Court's Scofield 3 s test to
the facts in Pattern Markers' also demonstrates that the Court's
holding is justified. " 9 To pass scrutiny under the three-part test
enunciated in Scofield,4 0 a union must first demonstrate that it has
127. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3074.
128. See supra note 91.
129. Id.
130. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3075.
131. See supra note 1.
132. See supra note 2 (unions may not coerce employees in the exercise of their
§ 7 rights), and note 3 (employees have a "right to refrain" from engaging in concerted activities).
133. See supra note 1.
134. See supra note 3.
135. Section 1 of the Act establishes the protection of employee freedom of association as a fundamental purpose of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). This section provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association,self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
136. 7 C.J.S. Associations § 24 (1980).
137.

Id.

138. For a description of this test, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
139. Although the Court in Pattern Makers' did not specifically apply the
Scofield test to invalidate League Law 13, it did note that "[slection 8(b)(1)(A) allows
unions to enforce only those rules that 'impai[r] no policy Congress has imbedded in
the labor laws
. "Pattern Makers', 105 S.Ct. at 3070 (citing Scofield, 394 U.S.
at 430).
140. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 423.
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a legitimate interest in limiting its members' right to resign. 4 ' Although a union has a legitimate interest in maintaining group solidarity during a strike, neither the advancement nor protection of
this interest requires granting to the union the right to fine ex-members for ending their participation in a strike and resigning from the
union. While a member may be sympathetic to a strike when it is
first called, unanticipated events may lead the member to return to
work. 142 When the cost of returning to work is approximately equal
to what an employee earns,"4 the interest in maintaining group solidarity does not outweigh the individual's section 7 rights."4 The
substantial disciplinary measures which a union may already possess
are more than adequate to encourage solidarity and obedience to the
will of the majority without infringing on the right to refrain from
45
concerted activity.1
Under the second part of the Scofield test, a union rule must
not "invade or frustrate" an overriding policy of the labor laws." 6 As
the Pattern Makers' Court noted, restricting resignation interferes
with an individual's section 7 right 4 7 to refrain from concerted activity."48 To permit a union to extend to prospective ex-members the
coercion of judicially enforceable fines would result in a judicial repeal of section 7 of the Act."4 Therefore, a union rule such as
League Law 13,150 which prevents a union member from resigning
141. Id. at 430. In a recent decision regarding restrictions on the right to resign,
the NLRB has held that restrictions on resignations impair the policy distinction between internal and external union action. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local
Lodge 1414 (Neufeld-Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1257, 1260 (June 22, 1984) (a rule restricting resignations "constitutes a unilateral
reordering of the basic employee-union relationship that directly and fundamentally
redraws the line between internal and external actions").
142. In Granite State, the Court observed in this regard that:
[e]vents occuring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely durationof
the strike may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with
which the employer replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less
provident.
Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
143. The employees who submitted resignations and returned to work in Pattern Makers' were fined the equivalent of their wages earned during the duration of
the strike. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
144. One court has observed that to equate union fines with total wages earned
by a non-striking employee is "the greatest form of economic coercion ... calculated
in design and effect to force an employee to act in concert with the union in future
labor-management strife." Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir.
1966). See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73 (1973) ("all fines are coercive to
a greater or lesser degree").
145. See Wellington, supra note 14, at 1032.
146. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430.
147. See supra note 3.
148. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3065.
149. For the full text of § 7 of the Act, see supra note 3.
150. See supra note 5.
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during a strike, contradicts, and thus frustrates the policy of labor
law, because the rule restrains an employee from exercising his
rights under section 7 of the Act. 5'
The third and most critical element in the analysis of League
Law 13152 under the Scofield test is the concept that union members
be "free to leave the union and escape the rule. '" s Under this part
of the test, League Law 13'1 is prima facie invalid. A union rule
that requires an employee to relinquish his section 7 right 55 to refrain from concerted activities during a strike is no more permissible
than forcing an individual to surrender any other statutory right.
The Court's emphasis in PatternMakers" 56 on the union member's

freedom to leave the union and escape its rule indicates that the
employees' section 7 rights are paramount to the union's interest in
maintaining solidarity.
In sum, League Law 13" " does not pass scrutiny under any part
of the Scofield test. It does not advance any legitimate union interest and it impairs a fundamental policy underlying the Act.15 The
rule also denies members the freedom to resign from the union to
escape the union rule. 5 " Given the failure of League Law 13 to pass
scrutiny under the Scofield test, the Court correctly concluded'"
that League Law 13 impermissibly regulated external union activities' 6' in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and was therefore
invalid.
In conclusion, the Court has resolved the inherent conflict between section 7 and section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. This is reflected in
the Court's conclusion that a union rule which prohibits the resigna151. See supra note 3.
152. See supra note 5.
153. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430.
154. See supra note 5.
155. See supra note 3. See also Local 900, International Union of Electrical
Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court rejected union contention that employees waived the protection of § 7 by ratifying a contract clause affording superseniority to certain union officers because the § 7 right is not wavable).
156. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3070.
157. See supra note 5.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 138-51.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
160. Pattern Makers', 105 S. Ct. at 3075.
161. For a discussion of the internal-external dichotomy, see supra notes 44 and
45 and accompanying text. As the NLRB emphasized in Neufeld-Porsche-Audi:

[T]he fundamental policy . . . imbedded in the very fabric of the labor laws
• ..distinguishes between internal and external union actions. A consistent
and enduring basis for distinguishing between internal and external actions is
whether the union's action applies only to union members. By unilaterally extending an employee's membership obligation through restrictions on resigna-

tion a union artifically expands the definition of internal action and can thus
continue to regulate conduct which it would otherwise have no control . ...
Neufeld-Porsche-Audi, 270 N.L.R.B. 209 (1984).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:789

tion of a member during a strike, or when a strike appears imminent, is invalid because it is contrary to the express language and
interpretation of section 7 of the Act. With this conflict resolved, the
Court has chosen not to abandon the individual and his section 7
right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities. The precedential value of this holding is evidenced in the Court's subsequent decision in Machinists Local 1327,162 which expressly directed the
Ninth Circuit to follow Pattern Makers'. Given the involuntary nature of the union shop provision, the Court has correctly balanced
the employees' right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity
and a union's limited power to compel strike activity.
Colette M. Foissotte

162. Machinists Local 1327, 105 S. Ct. 3517. For a discussion of this case, see
supra note 109.

